MENDENHALL TJ, BERGE JM, HARPER P, GREENCROW B, LITTLEWALKER N, WHITEEAGLE S and BROWNOWL S. Nursing Inquiry 2010; 17: 359–372 The Family Education Diabetes Series (FEDS): community‐based participatory research with a midwestern American Indian communityIndigenous people around the globe tend to struggle with poorer health and well‐being than their non‐indigenous counterparts. One area that this is especially evident is in the epidemic of diabetes in North America’s American Indians (AIs) – who evidence higher prevalence rates and concomitant disease‐related complications (...) than any other racial/ethnic group. As researchers and AI communities work together to transcend conventional top‐down, service‐delivery approaches to care, community‐based participatory research is beginning to show promise as a way to partner contemporary biomedical knowledge with the lived‐experience, wisdom, and customs of Indigenous people. This study describes the Family Education Diabetes Series (FEDS) as an example of such effort, and highlights pilot findings assessing its value and impact across key diabetes‐relevant variables. Following 36 intervention participants across baseline, 3‐month, and 6‐month time periods, data show significant improvements in weight, blood pressure, and metabolic control (A1c). Strengths and limitations of this investigation are presented, along with suggestions about how to further advance and empirically test the work across other Indigenous communities. (shrink)

It is perhaps ironic that a methodology still convinced of its radical iconoclasm and progressive nature should at the same time be regarded as critically backward, a by‐product of a disappearing philosophy. Such a view of the historical‐critical method is held by John Milbank who argues that because of its dependence upon heretical philosophies that affirm the ontological autonomy of a world without reference to or participation in God, it should be confined to theological history. This essay will argue that (...) Milbank's challenge ought to be taken seriously by Christian biblical interpreters and suggests that historical‐critical study, in the form criticised by Milbank, needs to be rejected. Milbank exposes the philosophical bankruptcy of the method from a Christian perspective; nevertheless, Milbank overstretches himself. His rejection of the historical‐critical method results in a hermeneutic that has no place for a biblical text's historical particularity and sense. Because of this, he is left subsuming historic texts into the regula fidei of his philosophical meta‐narrative, whether they fit such a move or not. This is particularly the case with Milbank's treatment of biblical texts, which, it shall be argued, operates as a refusal of history and a refusal of the particularity and alterity of the text. This highlights the need for an historical hermeneutic for Christian biblical interpretation, based on theological presuppositions, which takes the theological value of both historical particularity and the text seriously. (shrink)

The Industrial Enlightenment is widely thought to have been a period when “science” and “technology” became intimately intertwined. In his 1791 book on the building of the Eddystone lighthouse (completed in 1759), the English engineer John Smeaton praised the Royal Society for being more than a group of abstract theoreticians. This article looks at the fellows of Smeaton's Royal Society network who contributed knowledge, reports, specimens, and inventions solicited by Smeaton when he was working on this lighthouse project. I show, (...) in line with other recent research on this topic, that the “artisans” of the 18th century did not confine themselves to practical know-how, and that “scholars” were not merely interested in abstract philosophising; instead, the figures I look at in this paper were hybrid knowers who possessed useful knowledge and book learning. I argue that the advice solicited by Smeaton during the building of the lighthouse was characterised not by exchanges between theory and practice, but by a combining of different types of knowledge from separate fields. A second feature of this intellectual co-operation is that it was not centred on a group of practical industrialists or engineers, but rather it was the Royal Society that served as the common denominator, bringing all of the characters in our story into contact with each other. This is reflected in the subject matter involved, which was characteristic of the research focus of the virtuoso tradition in the 18th-century Royal Society. Smeaton's contact with this tradition was influenced by his friendships, his social activities, and, indirectly, by the way that the dissensions that occupied the Royal Society during the early 1780s impacted his retrospective account of the project. (shrink)

Each of the five volumes in the Stone Art Theory Institutes series—and the seminars on which they are based—brings together a range of scholars who are not always directly familiar with one another’s work. The outcome of each of these convergences is an extensive and “unpredictable conversation” on knotty and provocative issues about art. This fourth volume in the series, _Beyond the Aesthetic and the Anti-Aesthetic_, focuses on questions revolving around the concepts of the aesthetic, the anti-aesthetic, and the political. (...) The book is about the fact that now, almost thirty years after Hal Foster defined the anti-aesthetic, there is still no viable alternative to the dichotomy between aesthetics and anti- or non-aesthetic art. The impasse is made more difficult by the proliferation of identity politics, and it is made less negotiable by the hegemony of anti-aesthetics in academic discourse on art. The central question of this book is whether artists and academicians are free of this choice in practice, in pedagogy, and in theory. The contributors are Stéphanie Benzaquen, J. M. Bern­stein, Karen Busk-Jepsen, Luis Camnitzer, Diarmuid Costello, Joana Cunha Leal, Angela Dimitrakaki, Alexander Dumbadze, T. Brandon Evans, Geng Youzhuang, Boris Groys, Beáta Hock, Gordon Hughes, Michael Kelly, Grant Kester, Meredith Kooi, Cary Levine, Sunil Manghani, William Mazzarella, Justin McKeown, Andrew McNamara, Eve Meltzer, Nadja Millner-Larsen, Maria Filomena Molder, Carrie Noland, Gary Peters, Aaron Richmond, Lauren Ross, Toni Ross, Eva Schürmann, Gregory Sholette, Noah Simblist, Jon Simons, Robert Storr, Martin Sundberg, Timotheus Vermeulen, and Rebecca Zorach. (shrink)

Die Frequenzkurven, die die lebendige Substanz charakterisieren, können als eine statische Beschreibung oder als das Ergebnis einer Entwicklung betrachtet werden.Im ersten Falle akzeptiert man ohne weiteres die gegebenen Verteilungen und man versucht, ihnen durch mathematische Gleichungen, die keine unmittelbare Wirklich-keitsbedeutung haben, nahezukommen. Das kausale Denken wird hier ausgeschaltet oder man gibt sich wenigstens mit nur sehr groben Analogien zufrieden.Verschiedene Methoden über die Genese der Frequenzkurven werden besprochen; dabei wird gezeigt, dass die Mehrheit der Fälle auf Hypothesen beruht, die biologisch wenig (...) begründet sind. Eine Ausnahme davon macht die Theorie vonJ. C. Kapteyn, weil er den Vorgang des Wachstums in die Genese einbezieht. Seine Methode weiter ausbauend kann man sich vorstellen, dass die Genese einer Frequenzkurve in erblich homogenem Pflanzenmaterial durch Variation der Wachstumsgeschwindigkeit zustandekommt.Auf solche Weise kann man in einem Koordinatensystem mit Länge und Zeit als Koordinaten ein “Deviationsraster” konstruieren.In einem experimentell untersuchten Fall ergab die graphische Methode mit völlig ausreichender Genauigkeit die schon gefundene Frequenz.Les courbes de fréquence qui caractérisent la matière vivante, peuvent être considérées ou comme une description statique ou bien comme le produit d'un développement.Dans le premier cas on accepte les distributions obtenues et on essaie de s'en rapprocher par des équations mathématiques qui n'ont pas une réalité effective. On ne recherche plus la causalité ou alors on se contente le plus souvent d'analogies très grossières.Les auteurs traitent des diverses méthodes de la genèse des courbes de fréquence et démontrent que la plupart des cas reposent sur des hypothèses qui ont peu de fond biologique. La théorie deM. J. C. Kapteyn fait exception parcequ'il introduit le processus de croissance dans la genèse. En poursuivant plus loin dans sa méthode on peut se figurer que la genèse d'une courbe de fréquence de plantes homogènes par hérédité s'expliquerait par des variations de vitesse de croissance.De cette façon on peut construire une “grille de déviation” dans un système en prenant longueur et temps comme coordonnées.Dans un cas essayé expérimentalement ce graphique donnait avec une exactitude assez grande la distribution de fréquence déjà trouvée. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The individual-community relationship has always been one of the most fundamental topics of social sciences. In sociology, this is known as the micro-macro relationship while in economics it refers to the processes, through which, individual actions lead to macroeconomic phenomena. Based on philosophical discourse and systems theory, many sociologists even use the term "emergence" in their understanding of micro-macro relationship, which refers to collective phenomena that are created by the cooperation of individuals, but cannot be reduced to individual actions. (...) "Emergence" theories attempt to explain the nature of society as a complex system by examining how individuals and their relationships lead to the creation of integrated and macro-social phenomena such as markets, educational systems, cultural beliefs, and shared social practices. As a prelude to activity, every researcher has to answer the question from the methodological point of view, how is it possible to study the behavior of social groups and how can we gain knowledge about the laws related to social groups? Anyone who deals with humanities and social sciences or any reality and phenomenon that affects human beings, inevitably deals with the reality that is emerging. In fact, emergence occurs when one level of reality emerges radically from another level. Examples of emergent levels of reality include how the mind emerges from the body; or the way society emerges from human beings. Therefore, when there is an emerging factor, different scientific disciplines should be used, because it is inevitable to talk about social affairs, psychology and neurobiology, as well as physical and even chemical. -/- INTRODUCTION Since its beginning in the 19th century, sociology has faced the fundamental question of what a social phenomena stands for? At a glance, sociologists deal with the study of social groups, collective behavior, institutions, social structures, social networks, and social dynamics, and ultimately all such phenomena are composed of individuals. Therefore, social phenomena seem to have no independent ontological status, and in this case, sociology is ultimately about reducible individuals. Different approaches about the micro-macro relationship, using the concept of "emergence", argue that although collective phenomena are created by individuals, they cannot be reduced to individual action. The term "emergence" is used to distinguish "emergent results" from " Procedural results". Results are called Procedural that can only be calculated by adding or subtracting the causes that act together. On the contrary, they are emergent outcomes that are qualitatively novel compared to the causes from which they originate. An example of such emergent results is mental characteristics that emerge from neural processes, but are not considered among the characteristics of neural processes of components - which are their origin. Philosophical debates about emergentism and reductionism focus on the mind-brain relationship, but as many philosophers have noted, they can be generalized to apply to any hierarchical set of features. The cognitive revolution reactivated a 19th century controversy between theorists of Identity and dualism. The theorists of Identity believe in reductionist materialism and elimination of metaphysics, according to which the mind is nothing more than the biological, while the dualists believe that the mind and the brain are distinct from each other. Emergence has been considered as a third way between the theories of Identity and dualism. -/- METHODOLOGY Interdisciplinarity Is fundamentally indicated by the dominance of open systems as well as social and emerging systems at different levels. Therefore, as long as we are facing a new emergentism, there will necessarily be different fields and an interdisciplinary method. The commonality of social sciences and cognitive sciences on the issue of emergence provides the possibility of interaction and exchange of concepts between these two for deeper research. Therefore, in this research, apart from the concepts of Subvenience and downward causation, we have used multiple realization and wildly disjunctive, which are used to explain the emerging concept in cognitive sciences, including neurobiology, psychology, and philosophy. For analytical and interdisciplinary approaches, after examining the concepts of subvenience, and wildly disjunctive, Individualistic and collectivist emergentism have been reviewed. And then their adequacy is criticized and evaluated in meeting strong emergence conditions. -/- FINDINGS Philosophers of the mind have been able to define the conditions of irreducibility and downward causation, which are essential for strong emergence, by using the principle of subvenience with the help of multiple realization and wildly disjunctive principles. Therefore, by definition, emergentist individualism suffers from the problem of how to explain downward causality and irreducibility, and emergentist collectivism faces the challenge of reification. The analysis of the challenges facing the two methodological approaches of individualism and collectivism leads us to three unresolved issues about the emerging phenomenon, which are realism, downward causality, and mechanism. Despite the differences in the stances of these two approaches regarding the aforementioned triple problems, individualists and collectivists both agree that some social characteristics are reducible; and some others are irreducible due to their complexity, the determination of which, depends on the case study of the mechanism of emergence of each social characteristic. -/- CONCLUSION An emergence that is consistent with reductionism is called a weak emergence. And strong emergence includes the principle of irreducibility and downward causality. According to strong emergence, the characteristics of social phenomena have downward causal power, which cannot be reduced to the causal forces. The principle of subvenience, together with multiple realization and wildly disjunctive, can provide the conditions of irreducibility and downward causality, which are essential conditions of strong emergence. Based on the philosophical analysis of two methodological approaches, individualist and collectivist, it can be concluded that emergentist individualism suffers from the problem of how to explain downward causality and irreducibility, and reification collectivism faces the challenge of reification. The analysis of the problems faced by these two approaches leads us to three unresolved issues, which are realism, downward causality, and mechanism. individualist emergentists acknowledge the existence of emergent social characteristics, but despite this, they believe that these characteristics are not real but merely analytical constructs that require explanation based on individuals and their mutual actions. But collectivists argue that emergentism yields a categorical ontology and supports social realism. They accept the dependence of social characteristics on individuals, but claim that social entities and structures are ontologically independent. Individualists and collectivists both agree that some social characteristics are reducible; and others are irreducible due to their complexity; and the only way to recognize this is to engage in empirical studies of the mechanisms and temporal processes of "emergence" that create social characteristics. -/- NOVELTY The newness of this compact article is as follows: a) Presenting an interdisciplinary approach using the analysis of philosophy of cognitive sciences, including the philosophy of mind, neurobiology and psychology to formulate the issue of social emergence; b) Criticizing individualist and collectivist methodological approaches to the issue of social emergence and explaining the sufficiency and shortcomings of both in providing weak and strong emerging conditions; c) Explaining and categorizing the challenges facing methodological approaches in explaining the phenomenon of social emergence, in three categories: realism, downward causality, and mechanism. BIBLIOGRAPHY Beckermann, A., Flohr, H., & Kim, J. (eds.) (1992). Emergence or reduction? Essays on the prospects of nonreductive physicalism. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Bhaskar, R. (1979). The possibility of Naturalism. New York: Routledge. Bhaskar, R., Danermark, B. & Price, L. (2018). Interdisciplinarity and wellbeing: A critical realist general theory of interdisciplinarity. London and New York: Routledge. Blau, P.M. (1981). Introduction: diverse views of social structure and their common denominator. In Blau, P.M. & Merton, R.K. (eds.), Continuity in Structural Inquiry (pp. 1–23). Beverly Hills: Sage. Blau, P.M. (1987). Microprocess and macrostructure. In K.S. Cook (ed.), Social Exchange Theory (pp. 83–100). Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Brooks, R.A., & Maes, P. (eds). (1994). Artificial life IV; proceedings of the Fourth International Workshop on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. Clark, A. (1997). Being there: Putting brain, body, and world together again. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Coleman, J. S. (1987). Microfoundations and macrosocial behavior. In: J. C. Alexander, B. Giesen, R. Munch, & Neil J. Smelser (Eds.). The Micro-Macro Link (pp. 153–73). Berkeley: University of California. Coleman, J. S. (1990). Foundations of social theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Elster, J. (1985). Making sense of Marx. New York: Cambridge University Press. Fodor, J.A. (1974). Special sciences (Or: The disunity of science as a working hypothesis). Synthese, 28(2), 97–115. Fodor, J.A. (1989). Making mind matter more. Philosophical Topics, 17, 59-79. Giddens, A. (1984). The constitution of society: Outline of the theory of structuration. Berkeley: University of California Press. Hempel, C.G. (1965). Aspects of scientific explanation and other essays in the philosophy of science. New York: The Free Press. Horgan, T. (1993). From supervenience to superdupervenience: meeting the demands of a material world. Mind, 102, 555-586. Humphreys, P. (1997). How properties emerge”. Philosophy of Science, 64, 1-17. Kim, J. (1999). Making sense of emergence. Philosophical Studies, 95, 3–36. Kincaid, H. (1997). Individualism and the unity of science. New York: Rowman & Littlefield. Lewis, D.K. (1986). The plurality of worlds. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nigel, G., & Conte, R. (eds.) (1995). Artificial societies; The computer simulation of social life. London: UCL Press. O’Connor, T. (1994). Emergent properties. American Philosophical Quarterly, 31, 91-104. Popper, K.R. (1968). Conjectures and refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. New York: Harper & Row. Sawyer, R. K. (2001). Emergence in sociology: contemporary philosophy of mind and some implications for sociological theory. American Journal of Sociology, 107, 551-585. Sawyer, R. K. (2004). The mechanisms of emergence. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 34, 260–282. Sawyer, R. K. (2005). Social emergence: societies as complex systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sawyer, R.K. (2003). Nonreductive individualism: Part 2, Social causation. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 33, 203–224. Winch, P. (1993). The idea of a social science and its relation to philosophy‭ (SAMT, Trans.). Tehran, Iran: SAMT. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:560 BOOK REVIEWS recent discussion of Christian political theology in On War and Morality is correct, 1) Augustine was more Eusebian than we have generally thought, and 2) Luther was possibly his best exegete. Regarding Forrester's remaining political option, his leapfrogging from Tertullian to the Anabaptists misses the political theology of Western monasticism, which produced not only the witnessing cloister but also a brand of church-state theory (e.g. Gregory (...) VII and Leo IX) quite unlike East· ern Eusebianism. In short, Forrester's spectrum obscures more than it clarifies; the range of qualitatively distinct Christian political theologies is simply wider than he suggests. And while one appreciates a clear discussion of liberation theology, new paths to understanding are not opened. Loyola University Chicago, Illinois MICHAEL J. SCHUCK The Grammar of the Heart: New Essays in Moral Philosophy and Theology. Edited by RICHARD H. BELL. San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1988. Pg. 259 +xxviii. $24.95. Grammar tells us what kind of a thing something is, and this set of essays addresses what Paul Holmer calls the " grammar of faith." This grammar has been traditionally seen, however, in two markedly different ways: as one essay puts the contrast, a grammar of ' rational belief ' as opposed to a "grammar appropriate to affairs of the heart" (Hust· wit, 97). It is the second of these, the character of the grammar of the 'heart,' which these essays as a whole explore, and the sub-title of the 1987 symposium in honor of Holmer from which they are drawn- " Thinking with Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein "-indicates the two main avenues of exploration. Through these, we are told in the introduction, the authors intend to shift the concern of philosophy of religion and theology from questions of " epistemic credentials " to a construe· tive re-valuation of our age-an age which, arguably at least, is still as much " an age without culture " as it was when Wittgenstein first made the complaint. The hook consists of two parts, and each part is introduced by an illustrative selection from Holmer's writings on faith and morality, then followed by a corresponding set of six original essays. The first set of essays, the editor tells us, are " more philosophical," analyzing "the grammar of our modern culture and of religious practices in general," BOOK REVIEWS 561 while the second six are devoted to analyses of specifically moral and Christian concepts. Although the separation of the two may initially seem an artificial one, precisely against the " spirit of both Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard" which the essays are said to exemplify, it does in fact often result in the kind of overlap and repetition which are quite fruitful-for example, as in the mutually illuminating correspondence between the constructive philosophical suggestions about metaphor in the first part (Whittaker) and the presentation of the specifically Kierkegaardian understanding of the metaphorical ' language of love ' in the second part (Walsh). The collection as a whole is indeed in the spirit of Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard by virtue of its imaginative diversity of perspective. Although there is the predictable (and admittedly useful) exploration of the ' grammar of the heart ' in terms of the standardly Kierkegaardian categories of " risk, passion, paradox, and duty " (95), there are also proposals which are both unexpected and exciting. A glance at a few of these will reveal something of the particular character and value of this collection. The centerpiece of the first part is the explicit proposal in two of the essays of an understanding of the grammar of the 'heart ' in which the role and relevance of the private (personal, individualistic) is challenged and rethought in light of the public (social interaction and practice ). The ' heart ' at issue is found at the heart of community; the grammar of the ' heart ' is a grammar of the activities of a life in common, rather than of privatized inwardness or interiority. Glehe-Mcf>ller, for example, examines the relation between two views of religion in Wittgenstein's writings-a first-person (Kierkegaardian) type of religion and a sociological view of religion as a shared phenomenon-arguing that, in the end, despite an explicit adherence to the former throughout his writings, Wittgenstein's intellectual commitments... (shrink)

It is shown that Russell's Paradox can be solved without advocating the Theory of Types, and also that the Liar's Paradox can be solved in much the same way. Neither solution requires that any of our commonsense-based beliefs be revised, let alone jettisoned. It is also shown that the Theory of Types is false.

Context. The identification of the sources that reionized the Universe and their specific contribution to this process are key missing pieces of our knowledge of the early Universe. Faint star-forming galaxies may be the main contributors to the ionizing photon budget during the epoch of reionization, but their escaping photons cannot be detected directly due to inter-galactic medium opacity. Hence, it is essential to characterize the properties of faint galaxies with significant Lyman continuum photon leakage up to z 4 to (...) define indirect indicators allowing analogues to be found at the highest redshift. Aims. Long gamma-ray bursts explode typically in star-forming regions of faint, star-forming galaxies. Through LGRB afterglow spectroscopy it is possible to detect directly LyC photons. Our aim is to use LGRBs as tools to study LyC leakage from faint, star-forming galaxies at high redshift. Methods. Here we present the observations of LyC emission in the afterglow spectra of GRB 191004B at z = 3:5055, together with those of the other two previously known LyC-emitting LGRB, to determine their LyC escape fraction and compare their properties. Results. From the afterglow spectrum of GRB 191004B we determine a neutral hydrogen column density at the LGRB redshift of og =17:2 0:15, and negligible extinction. The only metal absorption lines detected are C iv and Si iv. In contrast to GRB 050908 and GRB 060607A, the host galaxy of GRB 191004B displays significant Ly emission. From its Ly emission and the non-detection of Balmer emission lines we constrain its star-formation rate to 1 SFR 4:7 M yr. 1. We fit the Ly emission with a shell model and find parameters values consistent with the observed ones. The absolute LyC escape fractions we find for GRB 191004B, GRB 050908 and GRB 060607A are of 0:35+0:10.0:11, 0:08+0:05.0:04 and :20+0:05.0:05, respectively. We compare the LyC escape fraction of LGRBs to the values of other LyC emitters found from the literature, showing that LGRB afterglows can be powerful tools to study LyC escape for faint high-redshift star-forming galaxies. Indeed we could push LyC leakage studies to much higher absolute magnitudes. The host galaxies of the three LGRB presented here have all M1600 >.19:5 mag, with the GRB 060607A host at M1600 >.16 mag. LGRB hosts may therefore be particularly suitable for exploring the ionizing escape fraction in galaxies that are too faint or distant for conventional techniques. Furthermore the time investment is very small compared to galaxy studies. (shrink)

First published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

For the conference and the special issue of the_ Journal of Consciousness Studies_ that lie behind this book, pairs of researchers were asked to tackle from different standpoints concepts of consciousness such as realism, representation, intentionality, information, control, memory and the self.